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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DAVID W. RANDLE 
Appellant 
vs. 
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Appellee 
Appellate Case No. 
20010287 
Civil No. 92490Q417 
Appeal From The 
Third Judicial District] Cou 
Judge Glenn K. IwasaWi 
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Utah Court of Appeals 
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Paulette Stagg 
Clerk of the Court 
Mary Beth Randle 
Appelle (Petitoner) 
Mr. Brent Chipman #626 
Attorney for Appelle 
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Telephone (801) 532-5125 
David W. Randle 
Appellant (Respondent) 
Pro Se 
9844 Glendover Way 
Sandy, UT 84092 
Telephone (801) 572-630 
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Appellant Requests Opportunity For Oral Arguemen^. 
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PARTIES TO THIS PROCEEDING 
The parties to this proceeding are set forth in the caption. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction: 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant 
to Section 73-2a-3 (2) h Utah Coded Annotated 1953, as 
amended. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court ignore Utah Law when it refused to 
grant joint custody child support when the non-custodial 
parent has the child 45 to 51 percent of the year and 
earns less income than the custodial parent. 
2. Did the trial court impute income in violation of Utah law 
since it did so without a finding of voluntary unemployment or 
underemployment. 
3. Did the trial court improperly void the parties premarital 
agreement and abuse its discretion in awarding attorney 
fees in this case. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Third Judicial District 
Court, the Honorable Glenn Iwasaki presiding. The Judgment entered 
on February 26, 2001 resulted from a trial that began in November of 
1997 with subsequent hearings on objections over a little over a 
three year period of time. 
The Judgment awarded Appellant (Respondent) additional 
visitation which allows Appellant the minor child 45% to 51% of the 
year, refused to award child support be based on the Utah Joint 
Custody formula, awarded Appellee (Petitioner) additional child 
support based on an income figure for Appellant that the Court 
acknowledges is almost double what Appellee actually earns, refused 
to honor the parties Premarital Agreement regarding attorney fees, 
and Appellant believes abused discretion in awarding attorney fees. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THE CASE 
1. In a Minute Entry dated February 4, 2000, Third Judicial District 
Judge Glen Iwasaki ruled that Appellant was not entitled to the 
benefit "Joint Physical Custody" as defined in JJdy_y_. Udy. 893 P.2d 
1097 (Utah App. 1995), because of Appellant's alleged 
nonpayment of child support under a previously unsigned order. 
This previously unsigned order ignored an earlier stipulated order 
with which Appellant had complied. 
2. Appellant has had custody of his son well in excess of 25% of the 
time ever since the dissolution of the marriage. (During the past 
five years this has been between 4 1 % and 51% of the time.) 
3. The Court clearly ruled that it would not reverse an earlier finding 
of a 1993 Trial Judgment that found that Appellant was not 
underemployed. Specifically on page 29 of the transcript of the 
Objections to Order Modifying Decree of Divorce And Judgment, 
The Court States: 
"So I think that his (Appellant) point may be well taken, that 
that is granted, the objection to strike the under-employed..." 
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4. The Court Further made a finding without evidence or hearing 
that Appellant had the ability to earn more than one thousand a 
month. 
5. Appellant objected to this new finding without a hearing or trial 
that was contrary to the parties previous stipulation. On page 30 
of the transcript it states: 
"MR RANDLE: Okay. I just want it on the record for my appeal 
that that was an issue never presented any evidence for in the 
court or argued or — or my ability to give a chance for rebuttal. 
THE COURT: Okay. Next issue? 
6. Appellee acknowledged that there may be a problem with the 
Court's ruling when on page 34 of the Transcript he states: 
"MR. CHIPMAN: - because otherwise, I think the Court of 
Appeals will have some problems. 
THE COURT: Well, and — and what I'm saying is it's not an 
imputation. It's just that I'm finding that that's just additional 
income, just like you said. 
7. Appellant (Petitioner) attempted to interject other findings into 
the order that were not part of the trial hearings in order to 
support a ruling contrary to Utah Law in the Udy v. Udy Case 
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One example can be found on page 35 of the Transcript 
where it says: 
"MR RANDLE: with a mortgage of 1,100 Apparently this purchase 
took place nfter the tiial, there was no evident^ submitted about 
it in any of the hearings we've had and his cannot be a finding 
without evidence. 
THE COURT: Mr Chipman? 
MR. CHIPMAN: Well, it was a - it was a proposed supplemental 
finding on the Udy case by Mr. Randle is right that that home was 
purchased after 199— 
THE COURT: All right. Delete it, then. Next one? 
8. The Court acknowledged that it did not remember the details of 
this trial that it was making its ruling on. On page 39 of the 
transcript it states: 
"MR. RANDLE: I don't know if the Court remembers — 
THE COURT: Of course I don't remember. 
9. At the beginning of the hearing tor OBJECTIONS TO ORDER 
MODIFYING DECREE OR DIVORCE AND JUDGMENT the court refused to 
allow Appellant to present an alternative Order before the court 
for consideration. 
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On page 14 of the Transcript it states: 
"MR. RANDLE: Your Honor, I would like you to 00 to allow me the 
opportunity to explain why I believe my alternative order is more 
in line with the Court's ruling. 
THE COURT: Well, we'll eventually get there, depending on what's 
left out of your line — by —line objections on the matter.... 
Later in the hearing when Appellant attempted to present his 
alternative order for consideration the transcript reads on page 
51 
"THE COURT: No, I'm not going to rehash, I'm not going to re-
plow this ground again, that's why we — that's why we just spent 
this hour. 
Mr. Randle, you know, the Court may have appeared to be 
short in the proceeding with you and —and with Mr. Chipman for 
that matter; but that's - I think that's something that ought to be 
expected when I tray a case in '93 meet her in '97, have other 
hearings on it in '99 and then now in 2001, I'm faced with the - the 
full cornucopia of all the objections that ran over seven years..." 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. When a nun custodial parent has a child over 25% of the 
time, the child support is to be determined using the Utah 
Joint Custody Child Support tables not the sole custody 
child support tables. 
The facts in this case are clear that the parties share near equal 
time with minor child. Appellant has been awarded about an 
average of 45% of the time with minor child with some years the 
percentage going just over 50% depending on which holidays fall 
on which years and which weekends. 
In Udy vs. Udy the court states simply and clearly that the Joint 
Custody worksheet is to be used when the visitation exceeds 25% 
of the overnights for a year. 
Since Appellant (Respondent) has child 41% to 51% of the 
overnights over a five year period, Appellant is entitled to this 
benefit. 
The Appellate Court makes a specific reference to this point 
when it says "Labels do not control the child support 
determination. This court indicated in Thronson v. Thronson 810 P 
2d 428. 429 n. 1 (Utah App. 1991), that the labels 'custody" and 
"visitation" ascribed by the trial court are not as important as the 
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description given by the court in defining their meaning in the 
context of a given case." 
The Court continues saying "Thus, the court must follow the 
mandate of Utah's child support worksheet or make findings of 
fact justifying its deviation. See Utah Ann. § 78-45-7 (3) (Supp. 
1994); Allred v. Allred, 797 P. 2d 1108, 1111 (Utah App. 1990)." 
This Court made no findings of fact justifying its deviation. In fact 
in the 1993 trial the Findings of Fact included: 
"5. Based on the evaluation of Dr. Sanders and observance of 
the court both parties love and are able to care for Matthew." 
Therefore, the doctrine of Udy v. Udy re: Appellant's child 
support obligations being clearly applicable, the District Court's 
ruling is in error and should be reversed. 
The Court's explanation that Udy v. Udy does not apply because 
Appellant had not paid child support is also in error. The Court 
can not fault Appellant for not complying with a verbal order from 
the Bench in December 1997 that was never signed into law until 
January 2001 and then use the rationale that Defendant is not 
entitled to this benefit because the verbal order (not the written 
order) of 1997 was not complied with. 
Had the Court not made the error in 1997, with a joint custody 
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work sheet in effect, Appellant may not only have not owed any 
child support, but perhaps even be owed some child support by 
Appellee. 
This is particularly true when it is considered that the Court 
seems also in error in imputing Appellants income. 
2. The Court is not allowed to impute income without a 
finding that the Appellant (Respondent) is voluntarily 
unemployed or underemployed and is not allowed to 
change Respondents income without a hearing on that 
matter. 
The Utah Code Section 78-45-75 (7) (a) states: 
"Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent 
stipulates to the amount imputed, the party defaults,or in 
contested cases, a hearing is held and a finding made that the 
parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed." 
Since the Court did not make any such finding, and no hearing was 
held on this matter, the Court therefore errored in increasing 
Appellant's (Respondent's) income by using the wording 
contribution instead of imputed income as a way to apparently 
attempt to circumvent Utah Law. 
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Furthermore, Appelle (Petitioner) did not present any 
arguments that there were any changes of circumstances related 
to income for the 1997 trial. Appelle did argue that her income 
had increased slightly. 
Since there was no finding at the trial to justify a change in 
income from the stipulated Order of October, 1994, which was the 
governing order for child support before the 1997 trial, the 
income agreed to by the parties for the stipulated order should 
not be changed. 
For the Court to rule that circumstances have significantly 
changed to void the previous stipulation order by the parties, 
regarding child support, then a new finding of fact with a hearing 
has to be made in order to set imputed income. 
Appelle proposed no such finding of fact in the original 
proposed order after the 1997 trial. A little over three years 
later Appelle attempted to insert such a new finding into the Court 
Order and Appellant objected to such finding citing the finding of 
the original trial which found that income was not to be imputed. 
The Court sustained the objection to the proposed finding of 
imputed income. 
However, the Court without any subsequent hearing inserted a 
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findiiKI ul ,i need Ini ,i "iDIIIMIHIM willioul .*IIV subseq1 
hearing or allowing Appellant to respond to this new finding. 
The Court is in error in using the term "contribution" as a way to 
circumvent .es regarding impuled in< nine What Hie 
court has done in effect is to assign imputed income without a 
hearing and in violation of the Utah Code by using the word 
contribution instead of imputed This is abuse of judicial 
disc -hould ^versed. 
In summary the Court has ruled that while income has not been 
imputed, that Child Support in this case is to be determined on a 
clitfcii'ii! I iii 'hul 111. it t III ih iliiluh Mil', ilci IMI.UI need1, In he 
reversed 
prupeny uismis.. I 
agreement regarding attorney fees and also abused its 
discretion in the awarding of attorney fees. 
Before I he parties were married a Premarital Agreement that 
included provisions for an incentive to resolve disputes related to 
divorce through mediation as opposed to costly litigation. 
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Contract which to date the Court has not enforced. 
The lack of Court enforcement of the Premarital contract on 
attorney fees has left Appellant with several thousands of dollars 
in debt that by the Premarital agreement Appelle (Petitioner) was 
obligated to pay. 
The Court basically ruled that the Premarital agreement is not 
valid because it contained no provision if the mediation failed. 
At the same time the State of Utah has actually gone further 
than the parties premarital agreement which only provided 
financial incentives for mediation and the State of Utah actual 
requires mediation of the parties. 
Furthermore, the statutes also provide no provision for failed 
court orders such as another case I am involved with where I am 
not able to enforce visitation orders by Utah Courts for over five 
years now, or provisions for bad Court orders that result in 
ongoing litigation over in some cases decades of time. 
The Court without comment has also provided no explanation as 
to why it has felt it necessary to violate Appellants religious beliefs 
regarding mediation that while not LDS beliefs, are nonetheless 
mainstream in contemporary U.S. Religious Society. 
Appellants religious views on mediation in divorce matters are 
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not unusual. In fact they are highly supported by both the 
psychological literature and the policy of the United Methodist 
Church where Appellant and minor child currently attend. 
The United Methodist Book of Discipline, which governs the polity 
of the Church states: § 65 D) Divorce -- When a married couple is 
estranged beyond reconciliation, even after thoughtful 
consideration and counsel, divorce is a regrettable alternative in 
the midst of brokenness. It is recommended that methods of 
mediation be used to minimize the adversarial nature and fault-
finding that are often part of our current judicial processes." 
(United Methodist Discipline Social Principles) 
As stated in the 1997 trial, the premarital contract is an 
enforceable contract by the Court. The contract did nothing 
more than provide a financial incentive to both parties to choose 
the religious values they had discussed prior to the marriage. 
The Courts reasoning that the contract was not specific is not a 
valid reason to not enforce the premarital agreement. 
This was not a case where mediation was tried and then failed. It 
is a case where Appelle (Petitioner) went right to the legal avenue 
without even giving mediation a chance, a clear violation of the 
premarital mediation agreement. 
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Had Appelle (Petitioner) in good faith tried mediation and it 
failed, she would still have the legal opportunities available just as 
the Utah Statutes now provide. In addition Appelle would also 
have had the option with some financial penalty to skip mediation 
as she did which option the Utah Statutes do not provide. 
The net result has been that the Court has allowed Appelle to 
thumb her nose at the Court, and the Premarital Contract. 
Appellant is simply asking the Court of Appeals to direct the Trial 
Court to enforce this contract that was developed from religious 
convictions and designed to avoid the financial disaster that has 
resulted from the Trial Court's lack of enforcement of this 
contract. 
Enforcement seems even more warranted now that the State 
Legislature has actually enacted into law statutes that go much 
farther than the parties premarital agreement and without 
providing any specific remedy other than going to court if the 
mediation fails. This is all the parties premarital agreement 
requires, except it only provided financial incentives to do so as 
opposed to actually requiring this course of action as the current 
Utah State Statutes do now. 
As a result of the Court ignoring the parties premarital 
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agreement, it has assessed $6,000 in attorney fees to the 
Appellant even though the court acknowledged that Appellant's 
actions were not brought about in bad faith, and even though 
Appellant was awarded substantial increases in visitation. 
Since the Court's determination of attorney fees are both a 
violation of the parties premarital agreement and were determined 
on inflated income formulas that Appellant does not really earn, 
this award of attorney fees should be reversed and the premarital 
agreement should be enforced. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court has chosen to ignore the Utah Joint Custody laws 
as clarified in Udy v. Udy, has attempted to circumvent the prohibition 
of imputing income without a hearing by calling it a contribution, and 
has refused to enforce a religiously based premarital agreement with 
financial incentives for the parties to mediate divorce issues. 
The Trial Court has further abused its discretion by citing non-
compliance with a verbal order in 1997 as opposed to the written 
order of 2001 as the basis for not implementing the Udy v. Udy 
decision despite the Court's opportunity to implement the decision 
back at the Bench Ruling of the 1997 Trial. 
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In addition the Trial Court has abused its discretion in awarding 
attorney fees that are both contrary to the parties premarital 
agreement and has done so based on inflated income of the Appellant 
that is almost twice what Appellant actually makes. 
Appellant pleads to the Court of Appeals for the following: 
1. to require that child support be determined by Utah 
Statutes using the joint custody worksheet. 
2. to not allow the terminology of contributions to 
circumvent the Utah Statutes regarding imputed income. 
3. to enforce the parties premarital agreement including 
the elimination of attorney fees from the Court Order award. 
The judgment of the trial court should be reversed in all of the 
above points. 
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CERTIFICATE QF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of appeal 
was sent v i a ^ g f p ^ S . Mail to Brent R. Chipman at 455 East 500 South, Suite 300, 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111. 
Date June 26. 2001 
David Randle - Respondent 
Page- 24 
EXHIBIT A 
STANFORD NIELSON (2416) 
Attorney for Defendant 
3760 Highland Drive, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: 278-7755 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARY BETH RANDLE, : 
STIPULATION TO MODIFY 
Plaintiff, : DECREE OF DIVORCE 
v. : 
Civil No. 924900417 
DAVID W. RANDLE, : 
Judge Glen K. Iwasaki 
Defendant. : 
Plaintiff and defendant stipulate to the amendment and 
modification of the decree of divorce singed and entered on 
December 6, 1993 as follows: 
1. Paragraph 10 shall be amended to read, "Plaintiff shall 
give Defendant notice if additional day care is necessary outside 
the institutional day care during regular working hours (8:00 a.m. 
to 5:00 p.m.). Defendant shall be given the first opportunity to 
provide care or exercise visitation with the child during said 
times. Notwithstanding the foregoing, plaintiff shall not be 
obligated to provide defendant said first opportunity when 
plaintiff has social engagements after 8:00 p.m. (Sunday through 
Thursday when the child is in school) which do not require her to 
be away from her residence overnight." 
2. As agreed by the parties the child support awarded in 
paragraph 11 shall be reduced to $125.00 effective April 1, 1994 as 
based upon a gross income of $1,000.00 for defendant and $1,568.00 
for plaintiff. 
3. Defendant shall pay to plaintiff the sum of $1,000.00 on 
April 19, 1994, $1,000.00 on May 19, 1994 and $1,000.00 on June 19, 
1994, representing sums due and owing for child support arrearages. 
This sum shall satisfy all child support due through April 1994 as 
well all day care due through March, 1994 and all attorney's fees 
due plaintiff to date. 
4. The parties shall use best efforts to be flexible in the 
scheduling of additional visitation and in allowing reasonable 
rescheduling when coi)flicts occur. 
Dated this C^/ day of April, 1994. 
Beth ^Randle" 
Plaintiff 
O—J 1y. £^£_ 
David Randle 
Defendant 
• X 2 S * 
On this crQ day of April, 1994 personally appeared before me 
Mary Beth Randle who acknowledged that she signed the foregoing document. 
Notary Public , 
CRENT R CH1PMAN I 
435 Eact SCO South #300 J 
Celt Lake C,r'.U:rh 84111 , 
My Co.T.missson Empires • 
February 2?, 1C33 I 
State of Utah \ 
Notary Public 
&V\A£)UV^ 
On this /P#7 day of April, 1994 personally appeared before me 
David Randle who acknowledged that he signed the foregoing 
document. 
7Z^/£c \^Cr^y\. 
ito*Mto***M*H*tffci A 
THOMAS P, ROBBm 
Notary Pubic 
STATE Of UTAH 
Comm.ExpimS92S.1996 
w OAYKEAXSI OR FMK eny vr  
I9W | 
Notary Public 
/° ,0£Z 
EXHIBIT B 
David W. Randle 
Defendant 
9844 Glendover Way 
Sandy, UT 84092 
Telephone (801) 572-6304 
Facsimile (801) 572-3827 
RECEIVED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
(OV 3 0 19! 
By. 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, DIVISION I 
MARY BETH RANDLE 
Petitioner 
v. 
DAVID W. RANDLE 
Respondent 
RESPONSE TO 
PETITIONERS 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF ENTRY OF ADDITIONAL 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 924900417 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Commissioner Michael Evans 
The following is a response to Petitioner's Memorandum in support 
of entry of additional proposed findings of fact and conclusions of Law 
regarding the applicability of the Udy v Udy 893 P. 2d 1097 (Utah App. 
1995) on the issue of Child Support. 
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RESPONSE TO STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
Agreed 
Agreed 
Agreed to the best of my knowledge 
Agreed 
Denied in part. In addition to stipulation to modify Child Support, I also 
agreed to paid in full $3000 to Petitioner for child support arrearages, attorney 
fees and day care. No agreement was part of the stipulation to forego a hearing 
on Respondent's contempt as Mr. Chipman claims in his Memorandum. 
Disagree. I do not believe Petitioners motion sought to specifically impute 
income in May of 1995. 
Agree 
Denied. The evaluation was to look at both custody and visitation issues, 
recommendations. 
Agreed. 
Agreed as I did not know about the Udv v. Udv case at the time of the trial. 
Denied. No Court Order has been signed to date. 
Denied. No Court Order has been signed to date. 
Denied. No Court Order has been signed to date. 
Denied No Court Order has been signed to date. 
Denied. It has not yet been determined by the Court what child support rate 
will be used and it is possible that Petitioner may owe Respondent some child 
support. In addition no Court Order has been signed to date. 
Denied. No Court Order has been signed to date. 
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17. Denied. I have paid Petitioner some medical expenses since 1997 including 
some of the current Orthodontist bills and have made an offer to allow Petitioner 
to charge amounts on my credit card to reimburse for other expenses that I owe. 
18. Unsure of this item. 
19. Denied. No Recommendation By Commissioner has been signed or sent 
to Respondent. Mr. Chipman gave Respondent until November 19th to send 
in objections to his proposed Commissioner Recommendation. Respondent 
sent in proposed changes to the Recommendation to Mr. Chipman on 
November 19th but Mr. Chipman sent in a proposed Order from the 
Commissioner without even considering Respondent's Comments. 
20. Agreed. 
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RESPONSE TO PETITIONERS ARGUMENT POINT 1 
The Ruling of the Udy v. Udy Case makes no reference to any requirement to 
make a written finding or specific finding on the record supporting the conclusion. 
The Udy v. Udy case states simply and clearly that the Joint Custody worksheet is to 
be used when the visitation exceeds 25% of the overnights for a year. 
I have had between 41% and 51% of the time with Matthew over the last five 
year period. 
The Appellate Court makes a specific reference to this point when it says 
"Labels do not control the child support determination. This court indicated in 
Thronson v. Thronson, 810 P 2d 428. 429 n. 1 (Utah App. 1991), that the labels 
"custody" and "visitation" ascribed by the trial court are not as important as the 
description given by the court in defining their meaning in t.i.. context of a given case." 
The Court continues saying "Thus, the court must follow the mandate of Utah's 
child support worksheet or make findings of fact justifying its deviation. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-45-7(3) (Supp.1994); Allred v. Allred, 797 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah App. 
1990)." This Court made no findings of fact justifying its deviation. In fact in the 1993 
trial the Findings of Fact included: 
"5. Based on the evaluation of Dr. Sanders and observations of the court, 
both parties love and are able to care for Matthew," 
There is absolutely nothing in record that justifies the extraordinary step of the 
court making a finding in deviation of the Utah Statutes in this case. 
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RESPONSE TO PETITIONERS ARGUMENT POINT 2 
Petitioner argues that §78-45-2(13) does not apply in this case 
since Respondent does not contribute to the expenses of the child and he 
has not been paying child support as required by the statute. 
There are many reasons that I have not been paying child support and 
they are described in detail below. The statement that Mr. Chipman 
makes that I do not contribute to expenses of the child is simply not true 
and is made by Mr. Chipman with no supporting statements of fact 
whatsoever. The issue of Child Support & the issue of expenses follow. 
Issue ofChild Support Payments 
In regard to the child support issue, it is important to note that 
prior to Petitioner's legal actions against me, 100% of all child support 
obligations were paid despite great financial difficulties. 
A brief history of the last few years is important to understand as 
to why child support has not been paid in the past few years since the 
1997 trial. 
On September 1998 I filed with the Court an Order to Show Cause 
related to several visitation concerns. This matter was referred to 
mediation by the Visitation Mediation program through Mr. Guy M. Galli. 
On September 9, 1999 Petitioner and I entered into a 
signed "Agreement To Mediate". (See Attached Agreement To Mediate) 
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At Petitioner's request financial matters that would determine 
child support, health payments, and other financial matters were added to 
the mediation process. 
The Agreement to Mediate included a section on Good Faith that 
states: 
"GOOD FAITH: We agree to enter into this mediation in good 
faith, that is, we will attempt to resolve the disputed issues by 
participating fully and genuinely in the search for fair and workable 
solutions." 
The Agreement to Mediate included a section on Withdrawal From 
Mediation that states: 
"WITHDRAWAL FROM MEDIATION: We understand that once mediation 
begins, it is a voluntary process, and that either party may terminate the 
mediation at any time. ... If either party or the mediator decides to 
withdraw, we agree to discuss the decision with the other involved 
parties , and to confirm the termination in writing." 
Several mediation sessions between the parties occurred from 
September 9, 1998 through August 11, 1999 that included 1 1/2 to 3 
hours of time per session at a rate of $125.00 per hour. 
As part of the mediation process, Mr. Brent Chipman drafted 
proposed Findings of Fact And Conclusions of Law and a Proposed Order. 
Mr. Chipman's proposed Order was used as the starting point for 
both parties to mediate a Visitation Agreement. 
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Both Petitioner and I made improvements, clarification and changes 
to enhance the visitation program. We have been implementing this 
mediated program for over a year now. 
On August 11, 1999 Petitioner and I met in mediation and completed 
a mediation agreement for visitation. Ms. Marci Keck, the mediator listed 
in her Interim Memorandum under "Tasks to be Done" the following 
notation "Financial Matters of Support (ongoing and arrearages) medical 
expenses etc. - Decide what you want to do with these issues." 
(See attached Interim Memorandum of 8/11/99) 
Without any further discussion or additional Mediation sessions, and 
not acting in good faith per The Agreement To Mediate, Mr. Chipman sent 
Respondent a letter of September 7, 1999. This letter stated in part: 
"if you will agree to begin making monthly payments on the support and 
contribution on the arrears (including day care, medical costs and the cost 
of insurance), then Mary Beth is willing to agree to the items discussed 
and agreed to in mediation" 
Mr. Chipman wrote this unethical letter despite the clear understanding 
that financial issues and visitation issues are to be considered as 
separate issues. Mr. Chipman wrote this letter despite the fact that the 
financial items had not yet been mediated by the parties. (See attached 
letter of September 7, 1999 from Mr. Brent Chipman to David W. Randle) 
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I acted in good faith that when Petitioner requested that 
financial matters would be discussed in mediation and that the Udy v. Udy 
case would show that neither party owed much if any child support and 
that Petitioner could possibly even owe Respondent a small amount of 
child support when the Mediation was complete. Ac a result of this 
ongoing process and given that Petitioner's attorney never provided an 
order for the Court re: revised Child Support, as the Court had requested 
him to do, I did not pay any child support from December 11,1997 to 
present. In addition for almost two years the parties have on their own 
implemented a visitation plan that provided approximately 50% of the 
time for me with my son in terms of overnight stays.. 
The Appellate Court has made it quite clear in Udy v Udy that 
Utah law defines joint custody as follows: (10) "Joint physical custody" 
means the child stays with each parent overnight for more than 25% of the 
year, and both parents contribute to the expenses of the child in addition 
to paying child support." In this sense of I have paid child support in full. 
The Appellate Court also made it clear that "Labels do not 
control the child support determination. This court indicated in Thronson 
v. Thronson, 810 P.2d 428, 429 n. 1 (Utah App.1991) that the labels 
"custody" and "visitation" ascribed by the trial court are not as 
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important as the description given by the court in defining their meaning 
in the context of a given case." 
Under the Mediated Visitation Agreement that Petitioner and I have 
been living by for almost two years, I have Matthew for an average of 181 
overnights or 49.6% of the year. 
Under the new proposed Order of Petitioner based on the Court's 
ruling of almost two years ago, I would still have Matthew for 150 
Overnights, or 41% of the year. 
It is clear that had Mr. Chipman not sabotaged our mediation process 
and had we operated under the Udy v. Udy understanding of child support, 
that I would owe minimal if any child support for the past few years and 
Petitioner may have in fact owed me a minimal child support payment. 
Issue of Contribution of Expenses 
Contrary to Mr. Chipman's unsubstantiated claim, I have 
considerable expenses that I contribute to my son Matthew. These include 
but are not: limited to: the purchase of most of M£**hew's clothing, food 
for Matthew for about half of the year, over $2000 per year in activity 
expenses for Matthew including but not limited to: school supplies, 
baseball, martial arts, classes, swimming lessons and recreation center 
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fees, church programs, occasional scouting programs, special events, 
activities with children in my neighborhood, shared cost with Petitioner 
in major purchases such as Matthew's most recent bicycle and total 
purchase of Matthew's prior two bicycles, ski expenses including lessons, 
lift passes, ski clothing and ski rentals, furnishings and toys for 
Matthew's room, special educational events for Matthew such as seminars 
at the Zoo, environmental education programs, national youth conferences 
and events, travel expenses for Matthew to visit cousins and participate 
in baseball tournaments, and agreed upon shared cost with Petitioner to 
share the expense of Matthew's allowance of $11.00 per week. 
I also acknowledge responsibility to provide for one half 
of non routine medical and dental expenses and I ha\<> made some payment 
recently to the child's orthodontist bills as well as prescription drugs. 
I clearly qualify in this case to have child support determined on a 
joint custody formula and should be awarded somewhere between a low of 
41% to a high of 50% as the percentage of time in the calculation of child 
support. 
If the court chooses to honor our mediated visitation agreement then 
my time should be 50%. If it does not then the average year will probably 
be closer to 45%. 
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RESPONSE TO PETITIONERS ARGUMENT POINT 3 
Petitioner argues that the Court is presumed to have considered the relevant 
factors to impute my income and therefore this somehow justifies an extraordinary 
deviation from the Utah Statutes. 
In fact the Court did not provide any findings of fact for justification 
for modifying the Court Ordered Stipulation of October 1994 that set my 
income at $1,000 and reduced Petitioners income by 30%. 
The Utah Statutes state in 78-45-7.5 (7) (a) Income may not be 
imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates to the amount imputed or 
a hearing is held and a finding made that the parent is voluntarily 
unemployed or underemployed". 
Petitioner did not present any arguments that there were any 
changes of circumstances related to my income for the 1997 trial. 
Petitioner did argue that her income had increased slightly. 
Since there was no finding at the trial to justify a change in income 
from the stipulated Order of October, 1994, which is the governing order 
for child support before the 1997 trial, the income agreed to by the 
parties for the stipulated order should not be changed. 
If the court is to rule that circumstances have significantly changed 
to void the the previous stipulation order by the parties, regarding child 
support, then a new finding of fact with a hearing has to be made in order 
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to set imputed income. I would then have an opportunity to respond to 
such pleadings or filings by the Petitioner. 
This was not done at the trial of 1997 and Mr. Chipman makes no 
offering of any such finding of fact in his proposed order. In fact the only 
finding of imputed income is in the 1993 Order that was superseded by the 
Stipulation Order of October, 1994. 
The actual amount of time I have spent with Matthew over the past 5 
years has ranged from a low of 41% to a high of a little over 50% on any 
given year. As previously stated, under the Mediated Visitation Agreement 
that Petitioner and Respondent have been living by for over a year now, 
I have had Matthew for an average of 181 overnights, or 49.6% of the 
year. Under the new proposed Order of Petitioner based on the Court's 
ruling of almost two years ago which has never been implemented, I would 
still have Matthew for 150 Overnights, or 41% of the year. The breakdown 
of this time is as follows: 
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Description Hours Overnights 
Alt. Weekend 1000 48.5 
Alt Weekend Baseball 735 30 
Mid Week 
6 Weeks 
2 Weeks 
Monday Holidays 
Easter 
UEA 
Birthday 
Thanksgiving 
Christmas 
July 24th 
July 4th 
Veterans Day 
Baseball 
Right of first Refusal 
120 
792 
336 
0 
120 
24 
12 
24 
144 
12 
12 
12 
200 
168 
0 
33 
14 
2.5 
5 
1 
0.5 
1 
6 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
9 
7 
Totals 3758 150 Overnights (minimum) or 41% of the year 
Actual Time by Mediated Agreement that parties have been implementing. 
Description 
Alternate Weekends 
Mid Week Visitation 
Extended Visitation 6 Weeks 
Extended Visitation 2X1 Week 
Monday Holidays 
Other Holidays 
UEA 
Thanksgiving 
Christmas 
Total Hours 
Hours C 
2400 
500 
650 
144 
60 
36 
24 
24 
144 
3982 
Overnights 
104 
26 
27 
12 
2.5 
1.5 
1 
1 
6 
181 overnights or 49.6% of the year. 
Note: That the major difference in overnights from 150 to 181 from 
the visitation schedule that Petitioner and I have implemented for the 
past two years is related to Mid-week visitation. 
Currently I keep Matthew overnight on Thursday's and take him to 
school in the morning as opposed to having Petitioner drive out to Sandy 
and wake the child up at 9:00 p.m. at night and then drive him back to Salt 
Lake as is the procedure described in the Court's 1997 ruling. 
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This arrangement actually increases transportation and food 
expenses for the child for myself and decreases transportation and food 
expenses for Petitioner. More importantly it greatly reduces the stress on 
Matthew and allows him to go to bed when he is tired as opposed to the 
court order of making him get out of bed once he is sleeping. 
If I were awarded only minimum visitation but failed to ever 
exercise my visitation, Petitioner would have considerable need for 
child support just to cover the cost of additional food and clothing alone. 
As it is I pay more for food, clothing, and other expenses outlined 
above than the total child support award was under the stipulated Order or 
Petitionee's proposed new order. I also pay more in these expenses than 
Petitioner currently pays. 
The Argument that I do not pay expenses for Matthew is ridiculous 
and has no basis of fact whatsoever. 
This is a clear case that the Udy v. Udy decision was intended for. 
This is a case where Petitioner makes more money than I do, the time 
with the child is almost equal between the parties, and I pay more of the 
expenses for Matthew than the Petitioner with sole custody does. Thus 
the need for determining child support on a joint custody basis is needed. 
In addition this child support issue seems to have become some type 
of financial game for Petitioner and her attorney Mr. Chipman. 
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Mr. Chipman clearly states that his client has no problem with the 
agreement that was mediated and agreed to by the parties (emphasis 
added) if he can also get some kind of financial bonus for implementing 
what the parties through almost a full year of mediation have already 
determined is in the best interest of the child. 
Mr. Chipman then further verbally threatened me with the statement 
that if the Court implements the Udy v. Udy decision that he would 
immediately seek a new order to modify my time with my son so his client 
could get more money. 
Mr. Chipman's values in placing money for himself over the best 
interest of the child is all to transparent. 
This action by Mr. Chipman is reprehensible and the court is 
encouraged to take appropriate actions against Mr. Chipman for this type 
of unethical behavior that has caused the Court Ordered Mediation to be 
sabotaged in hopes of the Court giving some kind of financial reward that 
is not warranted. 
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RESPONSE TO PETITIONERS ARGUMENT POINT 4 
Petitioner argues that though the court never really considered all 
relevant factors in determining child support or imputed income that the 
Court somehow did this implicitly. 
Petitioner used only one example of this so called implicit factor. 
The example that Mr. Chipman uses is that "Respondent has several 
advanced degrees, but has been "subsisting" on $1000 per month...." Mr. 
Chipman goes on to state that "With Respondent's training and work 
experience he is clearly voluntarily underemployed". 
Petitioner uses this example of advanced degrees as his argument 
that I am underemployed despite the specific finding of fact the court 
made in the 1993 Divorce Decree Order when it stated: 
"27. Defendant's doctoral degree is not marketable, and the court 
does not impute income to the Defendant based upon said degree." 
Below is a more detailed response to these vinancial issues related 
to the Child Support of my other son, imputed income, and the parties 
premarital agreement, all of which are relevant financial factors to be 
considered in response to Petitioners fourth argument. 
Issue of Child Support to My Other Son 
Petitioner argues that somehow child support should be increased 
because of the situation with my other son Jesse. 
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These are new claims that were not presented at the trial nor was 
I ever given the opportunity to respond to the imputed income 
assessment of Church owned property since the imputed income was based 
on the 1993 Order rather than the more recent 1994 Court Ordered 
Stipulation that set Child Support based on $1000 income of Respondent. 
My income has varied over the last eight years and has been as low 
as less than $1000 per month in 1999. 
My child support to my other son is a matter pending before another 
Judge. Mr. Brent R. Chipman is also the attorney in the matter with my 
other son. 
Nancy B. Randle, Mr. Chipman's client reported to me that Mr. 
Chipman advised her to unlawfully flee the state and to then file false 
child abuse allegations against me in Massachusetts , which she did. 
These false child abuse allegations against me were found to be 
unsupported by the State of Massachusetts. 
The Court has ordered a Bench Warrant for Nancy B. Randle's arrest 
with a $500.00 bail and refused to hear further argument until she appears 
in court. 
The Court ordered both parties in the case of my other son Jesse to 
share the cost in an expensive custody evaluation requested by Mr. 
Chipman, which I objected too. Final determination of fees are to be made 
when the matter is brought before the Court. This additional court 
ordered expense has also contributed to financial hardship for me. 
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Child Support payments to Nancy B. Randle have been agreed to be set 
by a signed stipulated order of the court based on the changing income of 
both parties as determined by federal tax returns. This order in part reads 
"2. Beginning November 1, 1995 Child support shall be set at $115.00 and 
paid directly to Nancy B. Randle. Child support shall be adjusted on May 1, 
1996 and each subsequent May 1, according to the Utah Child Support 
Guidelines. Both Nancy Randle and David Randle agree to mail each other a 
copy of their Federal Income tax return by April 15th each year for 
purpose of determining child support. Child support will be calculated 
each year using the previous years tax returns as the basis for child 
support calculations." 
Mr. Chipman's other client, Nancy B. Randle, has consistently refused 
over the past several years since she has fled the state of Utah to send me 
those federal tax returns to determine child support. 
Under Mr. Chipman's advice, Nancy B. Randle has denied me my Court 
Ordered Visitation for over three years. I have not been able to see my son 
Jesse since June of 1996 due in part to Mr. Chipman's unethical behavior. 
The Commissioner in this case has ruled that until Mr. Chipman's 
client complies with Court Orders regarding Visitation he is not going to 
order me to pay child support in this case. 
Petitioner (Mary Beth Randle) in this case, had knowledge of and 
assisted Mr. Chipman's other client, Nancy B. Randle, in unlawfully fleeing 
the state and in the filing of false child abuse reports. 
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Mr. Chipman is now arguing that because of his unethical behavior, 
for which I believe the Court should issue sanctions, that Petitioner 
should now be rewarded for this unethical behavior. 
Issue of Imputed Income. 
I have held the position of President & CEO of a United Church of 
Christ (UCC) Health And Human Services Ministry Organization before the 
parties were married, during the time that the parties were married and 
continue to this day to hold that position. 
I have been called to serve in the capacity of a minister to a church 
related health and human services agency that adjusts my salary each year 
according to revenues from grants, contributions and contracts. 
I can not be considered underemployed for continuing my work for a 
Church related Health and Human Service Ministry agency that I have been 
employed in for over 12 years simply because budget cut backs and 
depletion of reserves in the organization reduce and/or limit my salary. 
I have repeatedly expressed a willingness to adjust the child support 
contribution annually if and when my salary should increase due to 
increases in revenue from my employment. As previously stated I have 
done this with my other son already since this is the fairest and easiest 
way to deal with fluctuating income. 
I live in a combination office and parsonage of the UCC WHALE 
Center in Sandy, Utah where much of my work takes place. This building 
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was purchased with funds from the sale of a Logo and trademark to All 
State Insurance Co. The sale of this logo provided funds to purchase an 
office/parsonage, computer and office equipment, and an automobile for 
the ministry and program of this small church related organization. 
This purchase was not made on some income that was produced by 
my work but rather by the sale of this logo and trademark of the 
organization. 
Petitioner was on the Board of Directors when this business 
transaction of the purchase of the building was mac*. The decision to 
purchase an office/parsonage was judged by the Board of Directors of the 
UCC WHALE Center to be the most cost effective way to sustain the 
organization through tough financial times over the long run. The 
purchase of the office/parsonage was made at a time when the UCC WHALE 
Center had considerably more income in part due to Petitioner, who was 
also producing income for the organization at the time, as well as myself 
and 13 other consultants we had on a large project. 
The implication that this office/parsonage is somehow attributed to 
the earnings of myself is a misconception that Mr. Chipman has encouraged 
this Court to believe from the beginning of this case and it is simply a 
false assumption with no basis of fact. 
Petitioner lives in a home with her boy friend where the two are 
jointly purchasing a home with a reported mortgage of $1,100 per month 
according to Mr. Chipman's Memorandum. Petitioner has provided no 
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information as to how much Petitioner pays a month and how much 
Petitioner's boy friend pays per month toward the mortgage of her home, 
nor what percentage interest Petitioner has in the r,<,Tie, how much down 
payment Petitioner was able to afford, how Petitioner was able to come 
up with a down payment given her financial disclosure to the court a short 
time before the purchase of this home, or other important financial 
information that was not disclosed and/or available at the time of the 
December 1997 trial. 
The Court has not imputed income from Petitioner for having all or 
part of her home paid for by her boy friend. By Petitioner's own figure 
this would be at least $550.00 per month assuming Petitioner's boyfriend 
only pays half of the mortgage and more if Petitioner's boyfriend pays 
more of the mortgage. 
The Court has not imputed any income from Petitioner for the rent or 
ownership of her office space at her work even though the Court has 
imputed income from Respondent's office space where he works. 
I know of no case law to justify imputing church property used as 
office space as a persons income. This seems to be an extraordinary use 
of the the Court's discretion in this case. 
The Court has not imputed any income from Petitioner for the 
value of her health insurance. I lost my part of this health insurance when 
the parties were divorced. Given the heavy financl...! burden the court 
imposed with imputed income on church property and the non use of a joint 
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custody child support formula at the 1993 trial as outlined in the Udy v. 
Udy case, I have not been able to afford health insurance since the 1993 
trial. 
The Court has not imputed any income from Petitioner for the 
Social Security contributions her employer makes to her Social Security 
Account even though I am not in the Social Security System. This past 
year I have been unable to contribute to either my Annuity Pension or 
Family Protection Plan due to the excessive financial obligations the 
Court has previously imposed on me. Not being able to make contributions 
to the Pension fund or Family Protection Plan due to excessive financial 
burdens of the Court is certainly not in the best interest of the child 
particularly if I were to experience some unforeseen accident or illness. 
Petitioner & I agreed to a Stipulated Order, which has been signed by 
the Court, where we agreed to determine child support based on my income 
of $1000 and a 30% reduction of Petitoner's income to $1568 for the 
purposes of determining child support. 
The 30% income figure is the figure that the United Church of Christ 
uses to impute income for purposes of determining contributions to its 
pension fund and family protection plan. 
This order was signed in October, 1994, and was entered into in 
good faith by myself. The Stipulated Order also required me to make three 
payments of $1000.00 each to Petitioner which I went into debt to pay. 
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I am also paying on debts for attorney fees for both trials with 
Petitioner and actions regarding Mr. Chipman's advising his other client to 
unlawfully leave the State of Utah with my son Jesse. These latter 
attorney fees will most likely never be collected as long as Mr. Chipman's 
client stays out of the state of Utah. 
I have been paying off each month the Child Custody Evaluation from 
the 1997 trial that the Court ruled that I should pay. I am currently over 
$25,000 in debt including about $5,000 of that debt in high interest credit 
card payments. Payments on these debts has made my cash flow even 
more difficult and real discretional income almost nonexistent. 
The reality is that the two different litigations combined with a 
limited income of only $1000 a month which has to support most of my 
Matthews expenses is not enough to pay the Orders the court has imposed. 
Issue of Premarital Agreement 
Before I was married to Petitioner both parties signed a Premarital 
Agreement that included provisions for an incentive to resolve disputes 
related to a divorce through mediation as opposed to costly litigation. 
Petitioner has failed to live up to the Premarital Contract which to 
date the Court has not enforced. 
The lack of Court enforcement of the Premarital contract on 
attorney fees has left me with several thousands of dollars in debt that by 
the Premarital agreement Petitioner was obligated to pay. 
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Since the Court's initial ruling on the Premarital agreement that 
provided incentives for mediation, the State of Utah has actually 
enacted legislation that goes beyond the parties Premarital Agreement 
which only provided incentives for mediation, to th.; State of Utah's 
requirement of actually requiring mediation. 
The Courts initial reasoning that the parties premarital agreement 
did not provide specifics if the mediation failed seems in error, 
particularly now when the State of Utah which actually requires 
mediation makes no provision for failed mediation either. 
Furthermore, the statutes also provide no provision for failed court 
orders such as my other case of not being able to enforce visitation for 
with my son that I have not seen for over three years now, or the failed 
orders of this court that keep resulting in ongoing litigation. 
My religious views on mediation in divorce matters are not unusual. 
In fact they are highly supported by both the psychological literature and 
the policy of the the United Methodist Church where I am currently 
attending. 
The United Methodist Book of Discipline, which governs the polity of 
the Church states: "H 65 D) Divorce - When a married couple is estranged 
beyond reconciliation, even after thoughtful consideration and counsel, 
divorce is a regrettable alternative in the midst of brokenness. It is 
recommended that methods of mediation be used to minimize the 
adversarial nature and fault-finding that are often pirt of our current 
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judicial processes." (United Metnodist Discipline social Principles) 
As stated in the 1997 trial, the premarital contract is an 
enforceable contract by the Court. The contract did nothing more than 
provide a financial incentive to both parties to choose the religious values 
they had discussed prior to the marriage. 
The Courts reasoning that the contract was not specific was is not 
a valid reason to not enforce the premarital agreement. 
This was not a case where mediation was tried and the failed. It is 
a case where Petitioner went right to the legal avenue without even giving 
mediation a chance, a clear violation of the mediation agreement. 
Had Petitioner in good faith tried mediation and it failed, she would 
still have the legal opportunities available just as the Utah Statutes now 
provide. In addition she would also have the option though with some 
financial penalty to skip mediation as she did which the State of Utah 
does not provide. 
The net result has been that Petitioner has thumbed her nose at the 
Court, and the Premarital Contract, and the Court t? date has allowed this 
behavior. 
I am simply asking the Court to use its powers to enforce this 
contract that was developed from religious convictions and designed 
to avoid the financial disaster that has resulted from the Courts lack of 
enforcement of this contract. 
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Enforcement is even more warranted now that the State Legislature 
has actually enacted into law statutes that go much farther than the 
parties premarital agreement and without providing any specific remedy 
other than going to court if the mediation fails. This was all that the 
Premarital agreement of the parties did except the premarital agreement 
only provided for a financial incentive to do so, as opposed to actually 
requiring this course of action as the State Statutes now do. 
The Court was asked to Reconsider its ruling on the Premarital 
Agreement at the December 1997 Trial but to date has not made a ruling, 
leaving me in a terrible financial situation. 
Summary: 
My loss of health insurance, loss of annuity/pension, loss of family 
protection plan, inability to afford legal counsel, and major debt to 
income ratio due to previous Court rulings has left me unable to pay child 
support on anything but a joint custody formula as provided in the Udy v. 
Udy cage, 
I should not be forced to give up my religious calling due to 
excessive court ordered obligations that are not in conformity with 
the parties Premarital Agreement that were based in part on religious 
convictions, imputed income that is unjust to the facts of this case, 
excessive child support not in conformity with the Udy v. Udy case, and 
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attorney awards that have been previously made in this case despite the 
obvious inability to pay and in opposition to the parties Premarital 
Agreement. 
In regards to imputed income, I could understand if the Court used a 
reasonable standard such as the 30% that the Church uses nationally as a 
reasonable amount of total income that might be otherwise apportioned to 
housing, but can not understand the imputing of income by the Court for 
Office Space owned by the Church as income. 
Parsonage values vary widely all over the United States and often 
the value has no relationship whatsoever to income. For example in 
Hawaii, one Parsonage of the Pastor is actually the former Governor's 
mansion valued at several million dollars. In Snowmass and Aspen where I 
began my ministry, parsonage values are far beyond what any pastor could 
afford to purchase. For this reason the church has fixed a value of 30% of 
a pastors income to determine the Pension and Family Protection Plan 
contributions not the market value of a parsonage. 
Since housing allowances for clergy are not taxed and the IRS gives 
significant tax breaks for mortgage interest, clergy with larger incomes 
actually have a financial advantage to buying a home rather than living in 
a parsonage. It is therefore even more inappropriate for the Court to 
impute an excessive income from a Parsonage that has no relationship to a 
ministers salary. To do so would be the equivalent of imputing income on 
the Utah State Governor based on the value of the Governor's Mansion or 
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the President of the United States based on the value of White House. In 
both cases, like that of a minister, the use of the Parsonage comes with 
the position of the Office and is not related to income. 
The child support inequity of caring for the child almost 50% of the 
time and paying for the majority of child's expenses has got to be 
corrected so that I will once again be able to pay money towards the 
child's health care as opposed to litigation costs of Petitioners attorney 
fees. 
If I can no longer afford my own legal Counsel, how could I afford 
Petitioners. The $6,000 fees that were awarded to Petitioner despite the 
the fact that I prevailed in significant changes in the Visitation Order, 
Petitioner being found in Contempt for three separate visitation 
violations of which one involved considerable legal fees from my former 
attorney, and Petitioner obviously having much more financial resources 
than I do, again seems an excess in the Courts discretion. 
It is Petitioner not Respondent who is able to buy a home. 
It is Petitioner not Respondent who has just bought a larger car. 
It is Petitioner not Respondent who can afford legal Counsel. 
It is Petitioner not Respondent who can afford to send the our son 
to a Private School. 
It is Petitioner not Respondent who is able to take several vacation 
trips each year. 
Mr. Chipman suggests that the Court should consider all relevant 
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factors to determine the child support award. This is an opportunity for 
the Court to do just that and to include the above factors that the Court 
prior to date has not seemed to consider at all. 
CONCLUSION 
My failure to pay child support after having paid 100% of my 
obligation for several years is due to many circumstances. Under the Udy 
v. Udv case I have still most likely overpaid on total child support for the 
total amount I have paid since 1993 using the sole custody vs. the joint 
custody formula. 
Mr. Chipman's argument that since the Court Orders have nearly 
bankrupted me so ( can not pay child support, that the lack of payment 
should justify an Order for me to have to pay more than I would other wise 
be required borders on absurdity. 
Mr. Chipman's argument that my doctorate in Spiritual Disciplines, 
Wellness and Environmental Concerns should be used as reason to increase 
imputed income is contrary to the Courts finding related to the divorce 
decree and judgment in 1993 which clearly states that the Court finds 
that this degree is not marketable and does not impute income to the 
Defendant based upon said degree. 
The lack of enforcement of the premarital agreement by the Court 
has violated my right to religious freedom and in light of the recent 
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statutes regarding mediation by the Utah State Legislature, the Court 
should enforce this premarital contract. 
The Udy v. Udy case prevents the excessive rrvards of child support 
that are far beyond an individuals ability to pay and still have a 
significant relationship with their child. 
The Udy v. Udy case realizes the gross inequity and injustice of 
having someone pay more just because the Court Order awarded sole 
custody rather than joint custody when in fact they pay the same expenses 
of food, clothes, etc. that a joint custody arrangement would require. 
It is the application of a sole custody work sheet for Child Support 
based on excessively imputed income from Church Property that is 
inequitable and unjust not vice versa as Mr. Chipman would have the Court 
believe. 
The Court should credit Respondent with Child Support from 1993 
that should have been based on a Joint Custody Formula, enforce the 
legitimate premarital agreement contract as the court has the power to 
do, and reduce the income for both Petitioner and Respondent to the level 
that the parties agreed to in the prior Court Ordered Stipulation for 
purposes of determining child support. 
Since no significant change in circumstances have occurred or have 
been argued to change this Stipulated Order and since Petitioner was given 
a 30% reduction in income credit to compensate fo- Respondent's imputed 
Page- 30 
income this is the fair and just formula that should be used for the 
determination of child support based on the joint custody formula. 
I paid $3000 to achieve this Stipulated Order and it should not be 
eliminated without a change in circumstances and a hearing to justify a 
new imputed income. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 30th day of November, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Response was sent via fax to Brent R. Chipman at 455 East 500 South, 
Suite 300, Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
David Randle - Respondent 
Date: November 30, 1999 
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TIT 
AGREEMENT TO MEDIATE \W / 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-38, we, DAVE RANDLE and 
MARY E.G. (RANDLE^ , by our signatures below, hereby agree to participate in 
mediation. The mediator has explained the process and will provide services to us. We 
understand and agree to the following guidelines: 
GOOD FAITH: We agree to enter into this mediation in good faith; that is, we will attempt to resolve 
the disputed issues by participating fully and genuinely in the search for fair and workable solutions. 
HONESTY: We agree to be honest and to completely disclose all relevant information and 
documents concerning this matter to the other party and mediator. 
COURTESY: We agree to cooperate with the mediation process by remaining courteous throughout 
the sessions. We will refrain from personal attacks and angry outbursts, and will respect the opinions, 
perceptions, and feelings of the other parties in mediation. 
NEUTRALITY OF MEDIATOR: We understand that the mediator ser/es as a neutral third party whose 
purpose is to promote communication and help the parties reach a mutually satisfying agreement. 
She/he is neither an advocate, attorney for either party, or a judge and will not offer legal advice. Nor 
is she/he a therapist or counselor. Her/His role is that of a neutral facilitator. 
INDEPENDENT ADVICE: We understand that the mediator encourages us to consult with an attorney 
regarding our legal interests, rights and obligations. We have also been advised that consultation with 
other professionals, including a therapist or family counselor could be helpful in addressing emotional 
and psychological concerns which may accompany involvement in a dispute. 
CONFIDENTIALITY: We understand that the mediation process requires open and honest 
communication in order to succeed. Therefore, it is a completely confidential, and all written and oral 
communications made during the mediation are privileged settlement negotiations; and, we agree that 
no electronic and tape recordings will be made during the mediation. Further: 
The mediator will not reveal anything discussed in mediation without the permission of both 
parties. However, she/he is required to report certain matters, such as incidents of child 
abuse or threats of physical violence, and confidentiality does not extend to these matters. 
The parties agree that they will not at any time during or after the mediation, call the mediator 
as a witness in any legal or administrative proceeding concerning this dispute. To the extent 
that they may have a right to call the mediator as a witness, that right is hereby waived. 
The parties agree not to subpoena or demand the production of any records, notes, work 
product or the like of the mediator in any legal or administrative proceeding concerning this 
dispute. To the extent that they may have a legal right to demand these documents, that right 
is hereby waived. 
If, at a later time, either party decides to subpoena the mediator, the mediator will move to 
quash the subpoena. That party agrees to reimburse the mediator for whatever expenses 
cVi#»/h#» inrnrc in cnrh nn ar.tinn 
EXCEPTIONS TO CONFIDENTIALITY: The exceptions to the above confidentiality provisions 
include: (1) This agreement to mediate and any written agreement made and signed by the parties 
as a result of mediation may be used in any relevant proceeding, unless the parties make agreement 
not to do so; (2) Matters that are admissible in a court of law continue to be admissible even though 
raised in a mediation session; and, (3) The Visitation Mediation Program Coordinator is allowed to 
contact the mediator and the parties to obtain information about the case and the mediation session. 
CAUCUS OR PRIVATE MEETINGS: We agree that either party may hold private sessions with the 
mediator at their or the mediator's request. Except for concealment of assets and matters which the 
mediator is legally bound to disclose, parties may specify what will remain confidential from these 
private sessions. No private meeting will occur without the mutual consent of both parties. 
WITHDRAWAL FROM MEDIATION: We understand that once mediation begins, it is a voluntary 
process, and that either party may terminate the mediation at any time. The mediator also reserves 
the right to withdraw is she determines that the issues cannot be resolved in mediation or that she/he 
is unable to provide the services necessary to reach resolution. If either party or the mediator decides 
to withdraw, we agree to discuss the decision with the other involved parties, and to confirm the 
termination in writing. 
FEES: We understand that the fee for mediation services is $75 per hour, and is due at the end of 
each session. The total fee will be divided equally by each party unless otherwise agreed upon by the 
parties. If a party is impecunious, their individual fee will be waived. We understand that the fee 
applies to all the time spent by the mediator in activities related to the completion of mediation 
including: meetings with parties, research time, telephone calls, preparation of documents, and 
expenses incurred such as long-distance telephone calls or photocopies. 
Cost for mediation will be paid by each as follows: 
DAVID RANDLE at SfTfpp u^uori $8&kSfttfc 
MARY E.G. RANDLE at $^7.sn per hour. 
Finally, we agree to be on time, and if a change in appointment time is necessary, to give 24 hours 
notice to the mediator, or be charged for the schedule time (not to exceed two hours). 
We have read the Agreement to Mediate thoroughly and agree to the terms of the mediation. 
Signature Date 
Signature U Date / ' 
S p p - 2 0 - 9 9 l O - VV A c e - d M e d i a t i o n / M . L . K e c k 8 0 1 1 4 4 - 9 9 3 
ccord Mediation 
INTERIM MEMORANDUM 
p . 0 1 
Participants:_ 
Mecftator(s): y v ^ u ^ -
Date: 
Fees: $ ^ Z - S " -
fefeu tVSft^ Next Meeting:, 
Tentative fryppfflpntr - T * v ~ « . wl»-B >>_^a»=*^ " \ W ^ C f t J ^ ^ ^ f f f c l i — 
» ^ ft^ ^ J L t k v ^ C W ^ ^ - 2 . ^ - f ^ ^ ^ t . ^ r W 
Tasks to be Done: 
v-to. 
Agenda for Next Meeting:. 
w Notes 
EXHIBIT C 
173624 
T h i s P R E I I M F I T A L A G R E E M E N T , made and entered into this 
d a ' ofSEP 2 3 1988 , 195S, by and between David W i l l i a m 
R a n d l e , of U ' F a l l o n , IL, h e r e i n a f t e r called First Partv, and 
M a r y E l i z a b e t h G r o s s , of St. L o u i s , MO, h e r e i n a f t e r called 
S e c o n d Farty, W I T N E S S E T H : 
W h e r e a s the p a r t i e s intend to m a r r y , and in 
a n t i c i p a t i o n thereof desire to fix and determine by 
a n t e n u p t i a l , or p r e m a r i t a l , agreement that each of them 
shal 1 »•»=< 1 »»e , r e l i n q u i s h , r e l e a s e , and r enounce an/ and all 
c 1 a 1m or in te r e s t either m ay otherwise have acquired, b-
v i r h j p ni th«ir m a r r i a g e , in a n a f o *  h e D r oc» e r t*' of t h a 
other o'lri?-j or accumulated prior tc the m a r r i a g e ; and 
Wr areas there has been a f u l l , fair, and adequate 
d i s c l o s u r e of a s s e s t s of the p a r t i e s , as well as full 
o p p o r t u n i t y for independent legal c o u n s e l i n g c o n c e r n i n g the 
m a t t e r s c o n t a i n e d in this A g r e e m e n t ; 
NOW, T H E R E F O R E , it is agreed as f o l l o w s : 
1. S e p e r a t e ownership of p r o p e r t y a c q u i r e d prior to the 
m a r r i a g e . After the m a r r i a g e of the parties each shall 
c o n t i n u e to hold and retain separate title and r i g h t s in 
and to any and all p r o p e r t y each owns at the time of the 
m a r r i a g e (hereinafter c a l l e d Prior P r o p e r t y ) . Each party 
a c k n o w l e d g e s that the other shall have full and 
u n r e s t r i c t e d right to s e l l , t r a n s f e r , a s s i g n , encumber, 
or o t h e r w i s e dispose of such s e p a r a t e Prior Property, and 
income therefrom ( i n c l u d i n g a f t e r - m a r r i a g e interest, 
r e n t s , d i v i d e n d s , and stock s p l i t s ) , free from any claim, 
. d e m a n d , community p r o p e r t y r i g h t s , or s t a t u t o r y interest 
of the other which m i g h t have arisen in any way because 
of the m a r r i a g e of the p a r t i e s . 
Such separate o w n e r s h i p of Prior Property shall apply to 
any s u b s t i t u t i o n s and r e p l a c e m e n t s of such Prior Froperty 
d u r i n g the m a r r i a g e . 
P r o v i s i o n in lieu of marital r i g h t s . For and in 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the m a r r i a g e of the p a r t i e s , and their 
mutual p r o m i s e s h e r e i n , the f o l l o w i n g provision is m a d e : 
The p a r t i e s hereto c o n t e m p l a t e a happy and lasting 
m a r r » a g e w h i c h will be t e r m i n a t e d only by the death of 
one of the p a r t i e s . In the u n f o r t u n a t e event that tne 
m a r r i a g e should be terminated b^ divorce ''dissolution 1 
for an'- r e a s o n , r e g a r d l e s s of fault, j u r i s d i c t i o n , or 
w h i c h party is p e t i t i o n e r , the foil o»*> ing shall ap p 1 >': 
"That the w a i v e r s , r e1 in q uis hme n t s , r e l e a s e , and 
r e n u n c i a t i o n s of the p a r t i e s in and to the Prior Property 
of the other as herein set forth shall apply with full 
f o r c e and effect to any p o s s i b l e claim ior property, 
al imony, or attorney -fees of or from the other in respect 
to such Prior P r o p e r t y . Further, that any property 
a c q u i r e d through the joint efforts of the p a r t i e s after 
the marriage shall be divided equally.*' (.except as 
o t h e r w i s e provided for in this agreement) 
It is further agreed that each party wi11 m a i n t a i n their 
own separate a n n u i t y , pension, IRA, Social S e c u r i t y , or 
other retirement b e n e f i t s and that these will not be 
subject to division of property should the unfortunate 
event of divorce take p l a c e . pr" J ! /'! / p«--
D i v o r c e M e d i a t i o n A g r e e m e n t . Recognizing the costly and 
often unnecessary use of attorneys in the u n f o rt u n a t e 
e ve n t of d i v or c e, each cart y agr e e s t o c h oo s e the op t i on 
of a m e d i a tor t o help in re s o1ving an y d i = r J t e = ~hat may 
arise i n a. d i ,..' o r c e settlement. 
S h o u l d either party later decide to utilize an attorney 
for the purpose of separation or divorce, such party will 
be responsible for not only their own a t t o r n e y fees but 
a l s o those of the attorney fees of other party that may 
arise as a result of the need to defend as a response to 
any legal a c t i o n s that may be initiated. 
D i s c l o s u r e of a s s e t s , informed and voluntary signing. 
T h e parties a c k n o w l e d g e that each has made good, fair, 
and adequate d i s c l o s u r e of his or her a s s e t s which 
comprise such Prior P r o p e r t y . The parties have discussed 
the nature and extent of the assets of each. First 
P a r t y ' s Prior P r o p e r t y assets have a fair and reasonable 
m a r k e t value of a p p r o x i m a t e l y % 59,000 and S e c o n d Party's 
Prior Property a s s e t s have a fair and r e a s o n a b l e market 
value of a p p r o x i m a t e l y (SI,000) all as s u m m a r i z e d on the 
D i s c l o s u r e List a t t a c h e d to this A g r e e m e n t . 
Each party a c k o n w l e d g e s that he or she has had adequate 
time to fully weigh the consequences of s i g n i n g this 
A g r e e m e n t , and has not been pressured, threatened, 
c o e r c e d , unduly influenced to sign this A g r e e m e n t . Each 
p a r t y has had full o p p o r t u n i t y to obtain the advice of 
independent counsel upon the m a t t e r s in this A g r e e m e n t , 
the . app1 icabl e law, and the options available to him or 
her . 
S i g n i n g necessary d o c u m e n t s . The parties shall m a k e , 
e x e c u r t e , and deliver any and all d o c u m e n t s , including 
statutory w a i v e r s , c o n s e n t s , joinders, or releases-
n e c e s s a r y to e f f e c t u a t e their a b o v e - m e n t i o n e d intentions. 
C o n s i d e r a t i o n . The consideration for this Agreement is 
the marriage of the p a r t i e s and their mutual promises 
h e r e i n . In the event the marriage does not take place, 
this Agreement shall have no force and effect w h a t s o e v e r . 
!r-0717--r/80i 
7. After acquired property not covered. None of the 
-foregoing provisions shall apply to property obtained by 
the parties after their marriage (except income interest, 
rents, dividends, and stock splits -from Prior Property 
and retirement programs as previously discussed in 
paragraph # 2 ) . It is thus the specific declared 
intention of the parties that any and all property 
acquired by them after their marriage (except the 
aforesaid income from Prior Property and retirement 
programs) shall be treated in all respects as if this 
Agreement had never been executed. Any claims, demands, 
and in te r e sts whic h the parties own o r acquire b y vi r t u e 
of their marriage shall exist in respect to such 
afteraquired property, including any dower, curtesy, 
widow's or widower's, survivors, statutory, or election 
rights either has in the estate of the other upon death 
of such other party. 
It is further understood that all wages and salaries and 
related income (as opposed to the previously mentioned 
passive income pertaining to Prior Property and 
retirement programs) of the parties shall be treated as 
if this Agreement had never been executed. 
8. Binding nature of Agreement. This Agreement shall be 
biinding upon and shall inure to the benefit of the 
parties, their heirs, executors, administrators, and 
personal reprentatives. 
?. Entire Agreement, Amendment. This Agreement, including 
the attached Disclosure List, constitutes the entire 
understanding of the parties, and there are no other 
provisions, representations, or promises, express or 
implied, oral or written, other than as specifically set 
forth in this Agreement. 
No modification, termination, or amendment relating to 
this Agreement shall be effective unless made in writing 
and executed by the parties with the same formalities as 
th i s Agreemen t. 
1 0.Severabi1 ity. In the event that any provision of this 
Agreement is held to be illegal, invalid, unenforceable 
or against public policy, the remaining provisions of the 
Agreement shall nonetheless be considered valid and 
effective and shall be fully enforceable accordingly. 
11. Controlling State Law. This Agreement shall be 
construed and governed by the laws of the State of 
Illinois. 
Dated and signed by the parties the year and day first 
se t for th above. 
^
p2 31988 K-<f>71.7*::S 
FIRST PARTY 
to* 31988 
SECOND PARTY 
<L c ^ 
Dag i d W. R a n d l e 
0U6A £L 
Mar /^ -E l i z«d*e th G r o s s 
STATE O F ^ t S H ^ S c^f^N'A
 C0UNTY OF -^ ST .-£&&* &w wwo 
DAY O F 5 £ ^ _ 3 J 9 8 8 _ _ _ _ _ ON T H I S 1988 BEFORE 
ME, A NOTARY PUBLIC IN AND FOR SAID COUNTY AND STATE, 
PERSONALLY APPEARED Ct^ t^ .g W. l«„s//< AND 
flU. KV £?, +a. AtStX Qin-^tTD ME PERSONALLY KNOWN, WHO DID 
ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THEY SIGNED THE FOREGOING AGREEMENT, 
THAT THEY SIGNED THE SAHEAS/THEIR VOLUNTARY ACT AND 
AND 
DEED, 
My commission expires: 
Notary Public in and -for sai 
County and State 
"OFHCIAI SEAL 
JL M. MEDINA 
NOTARY PUBLIC CALIFORNIA 
PRINCIPAL OfFlCE IN 
SAN DIEGO COUNTY 
My Commission Expires December 29, 1939 7 
R. M. MEDINA 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
220 W. Broadway, Lobby 
San Diego, CA 92101 
EXHIBIT D 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARY BETH RANDLE 
Plaintiff 
-vs-
DAVID W. RANDLE 
Defendant 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No. 924900417 
JUDGE GLENN K. IWASAKI 
Date: FEBRUARY 4, 2 0 00 
THE COURT HAS PREVIOUSLY REQUESTED BRIEFING BY THE PARTIES 
ON THE APPLICATION, IF ANY OF THE UDY CASE RE CHILD SUPPORT. THE 
COURT HAS REVIEWED PETITIONER'S MEMO IN SUPPORT OF ENTRY OF 
ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT REGARDING UDY V. UDY, PROPOSED 
SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF ENTRY OF ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW. 
UPON REVIEW, THE COURT RULES THAT "JOINT PHYSICAL CUSTODY" 
DOES NOT APPLY IN THIS CASE DUE TO THE FACT THAT CHILD SUPPORT 
HAS NOT BEEN PAID BY RESPONDENT AS REQUIRED BY STATUTE, 
"EXPENSES" OF SORTS HAVE BEEN PAID BY RESPONDENT. BUT EVEN 
RESPONDENT ADMITS NON PAYMENT OF COURT ORDERED SUPPORT 
REQUIREMENT. WITH THIS RULING, THE COURT NEED NOT ADDRESS THE 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES, BUT NEVERTHELESS, AGREES WITH PETITIONER ON 
THE OTHER POINTS ADDRESSED IN PETITIONER'S BRIEF. 
BASED UPON THE FOREGOING, MR. CHIPMAN IS ORDERED TO PREPARE 
AND SUBMIT SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CONSISTENT WITH THIS MINUTE ENTRY. 
GKI/jmb 
Case No. 924900417 
Cer t i f i ca t e of Mailing 
I ce r t i fy that on the 4th day of February, 2000, I sent by 
f i r s t c lass mail a t rue and correct copy of the at tached document 
to the following: 
BRENT R. CHIPMAN 
455 EAST 5 00 SOUTH, SUITE 3 00 
SLC, UTAH 84111 
DAVID W. RANDLE 
9 844 GLENOVER WAY 
SANDY, UTAH 84092 
D i s t r i c t Coujit-^Clerk 
Deputy^Clerk 
••Individuals with disabilities needing special accoinmodations during this 
proceeding should call 238-7300, at least three working days prior to 
the proceeding. 
TDD phone for hearing unpaired, 238-7391. 
EXHIBIT E 
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Bradley J. UDY, Plaintiff, Appellant, and Cross-
Appellee, 
v. 
Rebecca UDY, Defendant, Appellee, and Cross-
Appellant. 
No. 930791-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
April 6, 1995. 
Action was brought for divorce. The First District 
Court, Box Elder County, Gordon J. Low, J., 
entered decree from which cross appeals were taken. 
The Court of Appeals, Billings, J., held that: (1) 
child support award should have been based on joint 
custody worksheet rather than sole custody 
worksheet, and (2) failure to award wife alimony or 
attorney fees was not error. 
Affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part. 
1. APPEAL AND ERROR ©^982(2) 
30 — 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(H) Discretion of Lower Court 
30k982 Vacating Judgment or Order 
30k982(2) Refusal to vacate. 
Utah App. 1995. 
Denial of motion for relief from judgment due to 
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, 
is reviewed only for abuse of discretion. Rules 
Civ.Proc., Rule 60(b). 
2. JUDGMENT @=>355 
228 — 
228IX Opening or Vacating 
228k353 Errors and Irregularities 
228k355 Errors of law. 
Utah App. 1995. 
Mistake of law by trial court may support motion 
for relief from judgment. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 
60(b). 
3. DIVORCE <§=?308 
134 — 
134VI Custody and Support of Children 
134k308 Order, judgment, or decree as to 
support. 
Utah App. 1995. 
Child support award should have been based on 
joint custody worksheet rather than sole custody 
worksheet, despite court's award to obligee spouse of 
"sole" custody and grant to obligor of only 
"expanded" visitation, where visitation order gave 
obligor spouse custody of child more than 25% of 
overnight visits annually, and obligor paid expenses 
for child in addition to his support obligation during 
time child was in his care. U.C.A. 1953, 78-45-2(10) 
4. DIVORCE <S^225 
134 - -
134V Alimony, Allowances, and Disposition 
of Property 
134k220 Allowance for Counsel Fees and 
Expenses 
134k225 Defenses and objections. 
[See headnote text below] 
4. DIVORCE <@=*238 
134 
134V Alimony, Allowances, and Disposition 
of Property 
134k230 Permanent Alimony 
134k238 Defenses and objections. 
Utah App. 1995. 
Denial of alimony and attorney fees was warranted 
where wife, after receiving child support, had 
sufficient monthly income to meet her needs. 
5. DIVORCE <®=^252.3(3) 
134 -— 
134V Alimony, Allowances, and Disposition 
of Property 
134k248 Disposition of Property 
134k252.3 Particular Property or Interests and 
Mode of Allocation 
134k252.3(3) Separate property and property 
acquired before marriage. 
Utah App. 1995. 
Award of $3,000 in savings account to husband as 
his separate property was not abuse of discretion; 
that amount had been in account at time of marriage, 
and was always maintained during marriage. 
6. DIVORCE <®=*299 
134 — 
134VI Custody and Support of Children 
134k299 Access to child by parent deprived of 
custody. 
[See headnote text below] 
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6. EVIDENCE <S^570 
157 — 
157X11 Opinion Evidence 
157XII(F) Effect of Opinion Evidence 
157k569 Testimony of Experts 
157k570 In general. 
Utah App. 1995. 
Award to husband of expanded visitation was not 
abuse of discretion, in view of wife's testimony that 
she thought temporary visitation schedule, which 
almost mirrored final order, should be continued, and 
in view of wife's failure to rebut expert testimony 
recommending expanded visitatioa U.C.A.1953, 
30-3-35. 
*1098 Jeff R. Thome (Argued), Mann, Hadfield & 
Thome, Brigham City, for appellant. 
Marlin J. Grant (Argued), Olson & Hoggan, P.C., 
Logan, for appellee. 
Before BENCH, BILLINGS and ORME, JJ. 
OPINION 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Bradley J. Udy (Mr. Udy) appeals the trial court's 
denial of his Rule 60(b) motion to set aside the 
court's award of child support. (FN1) See Utah 
R.Civ.P. 60(b). Rebecca Udy (Ms. Udy) cross-
appeals from the amended decree of divorce, alleging 
the trial court erred when it (1) refused to grant her 
temporary alimony; (2) divided the couple's marital 
property; and (3) granted Mr. Udy an expanded 
visitation schedule. We affirm in part, and reverse 
and remand in part. 
FACTS 
Mr. and Ms. Udy were married on July 27, 1987. 
They had one child, Joshua, bom August 1, 1990. 
During the marriage both parties were employed full-
time. For most of the marriage, Mr. Udy worked a 
swing shift from 4:00 p.m. until 1:30 a.m., and Ms. 
Udy worked a day shift from 6:00 a.m. until 3:30 
p.m. After Joshua was born, this arrangement 
allowed one parent to be with the child nearly all of 
the time and alleviated the need for child care. 
When the parties separated, they agreed that 
custody of Joshua would be shared. Mr. Udy filed 
for divorce, requesting that the parties' historical 
parenting scheme be continued. 
A hearing was held before a domestic relations 
commissioner. The commissioner entered a 
temporary order, awarding custody of Joshua to Ms. 
Udy. The order, however, provided for a shared 
parenting schedule *1099 almost identical to that 
followed by the parties during their initial separation. 
A one-day trial was held. Both parties testified 
that during the pendency of the divorce, parenting 
duties had been shared equally and that Mr. Udy 
cared for Joshua about forty-six percent of die time. 
Ms. Udy and expert witnesses testified that Joshua 
had adjusted well to the relatively equal parenting 
schedule. Mr. Udy testified that a significant portion 
of his monthly budget was used to provide directly for 
Joshua in addition to the court-ordered child support. 
The trial court awarded Ms. Udy sole custody and 
granted Mr. Udy expanded visitation defined as: 
On the weekend in which the father will have the 
child, he may pick the child up Wednesday evening 
at 6:30 p.m. and may keep the child Thursday, 
Friday, Saturday, and shall return the child Sunday 
at 7:00 p.m. to the mother's home. 
On the week when the father does not have the 
child for his weekend, he shall be entitled to have 
the child Wednesday evening from 3:30 p.m. to 
10:00 p.m. 
The court calculated child support using a sole 
custody worksheet, ordering support in the amount of 
$273 per month. 
The court determined that both parties had 
approximately equal disposable income after meeting 
their monthly expenses and therefore declined to 
award Ms. Udy alimony or assistance with the 
payment of her attorney fees. Moreover, the court 
found that the parties had very little marital property 
or marital debt and awarded Ms. Udy a lump sum 
judgment of $1500, reflecting her equitable share of 
the income Mr. Udy earned during the pendency of 
the divorce which exceeded her own income. (FN2) 
Finally, the court found that at the time the parties 
married, Mr. Udy had $3000 in savings, which was 
always maintained during the marriage. The court 
determined this sum reflected Mr. Udy's separate 
property. 
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I. APPEAL 
[1] Mr. Udy contends the trial court erred when it 
denied his Rule 60(b) motion. In relevant part, Rule 
60(b) provides that a trial court may relieve a party of 
a judgment in case of: "(1) mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise, or excusable neglect." Utah R.Civ.P. 
60(b). Moreover, "[a] trial court has discretion in 
determining whether a movant has shown 'mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect,1 and this 
Court will reverse the trial court's ruling only when 
there has been an abuse of discretion." Larsen v. 
Collina, 684 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 1984). 
[2] Mr. Udy argues that the trial court committed 
judicial error when it failed to base its child support 
determination upon a joint custody worksheet. He 
claims that under the court's expanded visitation 
order, he actually had custody of Joshua thirty-three 
percent of the overnights and Utah's child support 
guidelines mandate the use of a joint custody 
worksheet if the overnight visits exceed twenty-five 
percent. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-2(10) 
(Supp.1994). Mr. Udy alleges state and federal law 
provide that "mistake" under Rule 60(b)(1) includes 
judicial error, and that he is therefore entitled to Rule 
60(b) relief from the operation of the child support 
order. We agree that a mistake of law by the trial 
court may support a Rule 60(b) motion. See Jones 
v. Anderson-Tully Co., 722 F.2d 211, 212-13 (5th 
Cir.1984); Parks v. U.S. Life & Credit Corp., 677 
F.2d 838, 839-40 (11th Cir.1982); Compton v. Alton 
Steamship Co., 608 F.2d 96, 104 (4th Cir.1979); 
CJ. Oliver v. Home Indem. Co., 470 F.2d 329, 
330-31 (5th Cir.1972), affd, 487 F.2d 514 (5th 
Cir.1973); Calder Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 
922, 926 (Utah 1982); see also Richards v. 
Siddoway, 24 Utah 2d 314, 471 P.2d 143, 145 (1970) 
(indicating that within time set forth by statute or rule 
judicial error may be corrected by trial court on 
motion). We therefore consider whether the court 
abused its discretion in failing to grant Mr. Udy's 
Rule 60(b) motion. 
Utah law defines joint custody as follows: 
(10) "Joint physical custody" means the child 
stays with each parent overnight for more than 25% 
of the year, and both parents *1100 contribute to 
the expenses of the child in addition to paying child 
support. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-2(10) (Supp.1994). 
[3] Based upon the court-ordered visitation, Mr. 
Udy has Joshua for a total of 120 overnight stays per 
year. In addition, Mr. Udy has Joshua on alternating 
Sundays from early morning until 7:00 p.m., and on 
alternating Wednesdays from 3:30 p.m. until 10:00 
p.m. Based upon the overnight stays alone, Mr. 
Udy has custody of Joshua thirty-three percent of the 
time-which clearly exceeds the time required by 
section 78-45-2(10). Likewise, the record reflects 
that Mr. Udy pays expenses for Joshua in addition to 
his support obligation during the time that Joshua is in 
Mr. Udy's care. 
Ms. Udy contends that the trial court did not err 
when it awarded child support based upon a sole 
custody worksheet. She argues that because the trial 
court awarded her "sole" custody of Joshua and 
granted Mr. Udy only "expanded" visitation, the 
court had the discretion to apply the sole custody 
worksheet. We are not persuaded. Labels do not 
control the child support determination. This court 
indicated in Thronson v. Thronson, 810 P.2d 428, 
429 a 1 (Utah App. 1991), that the labels "custody" 
and "visitation" ascribed by the trial court are not as 
important as the description given by the court in 
defining their meaning in the context of a given case. 
Although labeled "sole custody," the trial court 
awarded Mr. Udy visitation that exceeded the 
threshold for joint physical custody under section 
78-45-2(10). Thus, the court must follow the 
mandate of Utah's child support guidelines, and use 
the joint custody child support worksheet or make 
findings of fact justifying its deviation. See Utah 
Code Ana § 78-45-7(3) (Supp.1994); Allred v. 
Allred, 797 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah App. 1990). 
The trial court did not make findings to explain why 
it elected not to apply a joint custody worksheet, nor 
why such a computation would have been inequitable. 
Thus, we reverse and remand for sufficient findings 
to support die court's deviation from Utah's child 
support guidelines or a recalculation of the support 
obligation using the joint custody worksheet. 
II. CROSS-APPEAL 
[4] In her cross-appeal, Ms. Udy contends the trial 
court erred by failing to award her temporary and 
prospective alimony. "We will not disturb a trial 
court's ruling on alimony as long as the court 
'exercises its discretion within the bounds and under 
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die standards we have set and has supported its 
decision with adequate findings and conclusions.1 " 
Bell v. Bell 810 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah App. 1991) 
(quoting Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P. 2d 1144, 1147 
(Utah App. 1988)). The trial court found Mr. Udy 
earned a gross monthly income of $2786 and had 
available income after taxes and social security of 
$1887 per month. The court also found Ms. Udy 
had a gross monthly income of $1720 and available 
income after taxes and social security of $1400 per 
month. 
Based upon our review of the record, the trial 
court's findings accurately reflects Ms. Udy's 
income. Including the $273 that she receives in child 
support from Mr. Udy, Ms. Udy has approximately 
$1667 to meet her monthly needs. Ms. Udy 
estimated her monthly budget at $1165. Thus, even 
if the court were to reduce her child support award by 
applying the joint custody worksheet, Ms. Udy still 
has sufficient income to meet her needs. We 
therefore affirm the trial court's determination 
regarding alimony. 
Under this same rationale, we affirm the trial 
court's ruling denying Ms. Udy assistance with the 
payment of her attorney fees. In the instant case, the 
trial court found that each party incurred comparable 
attorney fees, and found that each party had equal 
ability to pay their own reasonable fees. We 
therefore affirm the trial court's refusal to award Ms. 
Udy her attorney fees. 
[5] Ms. Udy also alleges that the trial court erred 
when it divided the parties' savings account as of the 
date of the separation and awarded Mr. Udy, as 
separate property, the $3000 sum that he had placed 
into a savings account prior to the marriage. "There 
is no fixed formula upon which to determine a 
division of properties in a divorce *1101. action[;] 
the trial court has considerable latitude in adjusting 
financial and property interests, and its actions are 
entided to a presumption of validity." Naranjo, 751 
P.2d at 1146 (citation omitted). "This court will not 
disturb the trial court's decision unless it is clearly 
unjust or a clear abuse of discretion." Walters v. 
Walters, 812 P.2d 64, 66 (Utah App. 1991), cert, 
denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992). 
Both parties utilized portions of the savings account 
for his or her own support during the pendency of the 
divorce. At the time of the separation, diere was in 
excess of $30,000 in the savings account. On July 8, 
1992, Ms. Udy withdrew nearly $12,000 to purchase 
a car. From the remaining balance, each party 
received approximately $9000. 
Additionally, Ms. Udy contends the trial court erred 
when it found that Mr. Udy should retain the benefit 
of the $3000 that he had deposited into the savings 
account prior to die marriage. In pertinent part, in 
awarding Ms. Udy property from die marriage, die 
trial court found Mr. Udy had earned $6000 ($530 
per mondi) more than Ms. Udy during the pendency 
of the divorce and found that that sum was marital 
income. The trial court therefore deducted from this 
amount the $3000 in savings diat the court held 
reflected Mr. Udy's separate property and divided the 
balance between the parties, yielding a lump sum 
judgment of $1500 in favor of Ms. Udy. The trial 
court has considerable latitude in dividing marital 
assets. We cannot say the trial court abused its 
discretion in its property division. 
[6] Finally, Ms. Udy insists die trial court abused 
its discretion by awarding Mr. Udy visitation in 
excess of die statutory minimum. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 30-3-35 (Supp.1994). The trial court 
awarded Ms. Udy sole custody of Joshua, but 
awarded Mr. Udy expanded visitation. The court 
found that Ms. Udy had not presented evidence to 
rebut the testimony of the experts who recommended 
expanded visitation. Furthermore, when asked at 
trial whether die temporary visitation schedule-which 
almost mirrors the final order-should be continued, 
Ms. Udy testified that she diought it should. The 
trial court's ruling is in accord with die testimony 
received at trial regarding die best interests of the 
child, see Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-34 (Supp.1994), 
and we therefore affirm the court's physical custody 
schedule. 
CONCLUSION 
We conclude die trial court abused its discretion 
when it denied Mr. Udy's Rule 60(b) motion to set 
aside his child support. The undisputed facts 
establish diat Mr. Udy had joint custody of his child 
and, dius, diat his support should have been 
calculated using a joint custody worksheet absent 
findings as to why the trial court deviated from the 
guidelines support. We dierefore reverse die award 
of child support and remand for further findings 
justifying a deviation from die guidelines or a 
recalculation using the joint custody worksheet. 
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With respect to Ms. Udy's claims of alimony, 
attorney fees, property distribution, and visitation, we 
cannot say the court abused its discretion and 
therefore affirm its decision on each ground. 
BENCH and ORME, JJ., concur. 
FN1. Mr. Udy appealed from the trial court's denial 
of both a Rule 59 and a Rule 60 motion. See Utah 
R.Civ.P. 59, 60. His notice of appeal, however, 
was filed with this court prior to the trial court's 
entry of a formal order denying the motions. 
Pursuant to Rule 4(c) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, an appeal filed from the denial 
of a Rule 59 motion has no effect if it is filed prior 
to entry of the final order. An appeal from a Rule 
60 motion is not similarly limited. Accordingly, 
on February 7, 1994, this court entered an order 
limiting Mr. Udy's appeal to whether the trial court 
appropriately denied the Rule 60 motion, finding 
that all other issues had been waived by his failure 
to file a new notice of appeal. 
FN2. The propriety of this part of the decree is not 
contested by Mr. Udy and thus is not before us. 
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